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Abstract A key problem with IT decision-making is that
the real value contributions of IT projects are unknown exante to their executions. Thus, an organization has to rely on
the expectations and perceptions of its decision makers.
Moreover, these perceptions are prone to biases and display
only a transfigured or irrational image of reality. This paper
examines how these biases are related to the business value
of IT (BVIT) and how IT decision-making can be rationalized. To this aim, a model is set up based on prospect theory,
which is a frequently cited theory from behavioral economics used to descriptively analyze human value perception under risk. Applying the results found via prospect
theory to IT decisions, the ‘‘perceived’’ BVIT is quantified
and analyzed. Based on the model, the paper shows that the
irrationalities rooted in human value perception provide
explanations for two central paradoxes of IT. First, it reveals
that they cause a disparity between the anticipated valueadding effects of IT and the actual measured outcomes,
reflecting a famous observation within BVIT research
known as the ‘‘productivity paradox of IT.’’ Second, recent
studies show that IT increases the operational efficiency and
competitiveness of organizations. However, only the operational effects are perceived in practice. In the paper, this
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one-sided perception is referred to as the ‘‘perception paradox of IT’’. It is ultimately concluded that a rethinking of the
position of IT within modern organizations and the establishment of suitable corporate governance mechanisms can
resolve these issues, avoid irrationalities, and positively
influence the performance impacts of IT.
Keywords Business value of IT  Perceived value of IT 
Prospect theory  Productivity paradox

1 Introduction
The globalization of today’s economy has increased the
competitive pressure on organizations. Companies must be
able to react rapidly to changing customer needs or to
technological innovations. Correspondingly, the role of IT
‘‘as a powerful competitive weapon’’ for encountering
these challenges is becoming increasingly important, and
every IT investment has to be critically evaluated with
respect to the business value created (Mata et al. 1995,
p. 487). This business value of IT (BVIT) is defined ‘‘as the
organizational performance impacts of IT at both the
intermediate process level and the organization wide level,
and comprising both efficiency impacts and competitive
impacts’’ (Melville et al. 2004, p. 287). A key problem for
IT decision-making is that the value contributions of IT
projects are unknown in the decision process; thus, the
decision makers’ perceptions of the projects are determinate. A characterization of the abstract term ‘‘perception’’
in cognitive psychology is the sensory experience of the
environment, which involves the recognition and the
interpretation of external information (Cherry 2013). Thus,
we define the perceived BVIT as the decision makers’
mental interpretation of IT performance impacts. A key
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problem with human value perception is that it is based on
heuristics and prone to biases (Gilovich et al. 2002). Such
mental shortcuts within human valuation processing lead to
deviations between the IT value perceived by decision
makers and the objective IT value, and, ultimately, to
irrational IT decisions.
The analysis of the perceived BVIT enables us to
determine where these heuristics originate and how IT
decision-making can be made rational. For example, we
can derive solutions for the productivity and the perception
paradoxes of IT. The productivity paradox refers to the
observation that most IT investments fall short of their
expected performance effects (Brynjolfsson 1993). In other
words, decision makers misperceive the BVIT. The perception paradox refers to the perceived value sources of IT.
In general, the performance effects of IT can be divided
into two categories: productivity and competitive effects
(Melville et al. 2004). Productivity relates to internal value
and is manifested in the reduction of operational costs
(Drucker 1966). Competitive effects are associated with
external value and typically show in competitive advantages (Barney 1991). In practice, however, it is mainly the
internal value of IT that is perceived. In a global CFO
technology study by Gartner (2013), only 10 % of the
respondents considered IT as a potential source of differentiation, whereas 31 % perceived the value of IT in the
enhancing of operations. Many researchers have promoted
the role of IT as a source of competitive advantage and the
need for investment in that type of IT (Devaraj and Kohli
2003; Santhanam and Hartono 2003). However, despite the
considerable successes of such investments in the past, this
facet of IT value has only partly influenced the minds of
practical decision makers. We refer to this one-sided perception as the ‘‘perception paradox’’ of IT.
In this paper, we utilize the value perception of practical
decision makers as an innovative, analytical lens with
which to examine the BVIT. In order to investigate the
effects of the described irrationalities of IT decisions, we
develop an analytical model for the human perception of IT
value based on the famous prospect theory (PT) from
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They formulate a quantification of human value perception that incorporates
several common patterns (e.g., loss aversion or asymmetric
risk attitudes) frequently demonstrated in behavioral
experiments. The application of their framework has
already been beneficial for other economic research
streams, especially capital market theory (De Giorgi and
Hens 2006). Therefore, it may also be useful in deriving
new insights for BVIT research. Although PT was originally designed for individual decision-making, it is at least
partially applicable for corporate decision-making, as is the
case for IT decisions. The perceived value function from
PT remains valid for organizational value perception if the
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context of the organization is considered (Shimizu 2007)
and if it is parameterized differently (Wen 2010). Investigating the BVIT through the ‘‘irrational’’ eyes of PT
introduces a new research perspective that can complement, confirm, and enhance existing research results. The
contribution of this paper is to provide a descriptive, analytical model of the perceived BVIT through which we can
shed light on resolutions of the paradoxes of the BVIT.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In
the next section, we describe the fundamental theoretical
concepts that our perception model is based on to substantiate the existing research gap. Then, we analyze the
foundations of the described paradoxes of IT, and apply the
derived results to obtain additional explanations for their
existence. Finally, we discuss our results and provide an
outlook on future research.

2 Theoretical Background
2.1 The Business Value of IT
In the 1960s and 1970s, information technology (IT) was
perceived as the ‘‘biggest technological revolution men
have known’’ (Snow 1966, p. 650). However, the technology could not meet these high expectations. As a result,
a great disillusionment with IT arose in the 1980s. During
this time, economic productivity stagnated, while the
number of computers increased more than threefold
(Brynjolfsson 1993). Moreover, the first scientific studies
about the realized value of IT provided controversial
results and thus exacerbated doubts about technology
(Yorukoglu 1998). Even Nobel Laureate Robert Solow
addressed the productivity shortfall of IT investments,
which became known as the ‘‘productivity paradox,’’ in his
famous quote: ‘‘We see computers everywhere except in
the productivity statistics’’ (cited after Brynjolfsson 1993,
p. 67). The value discussion finally reached its climax in
2003, with Nicholas Carr’s aggressive article ‘‘IT Doesn’t
Matter’’ (Carr 2003). In this article, Carr argues that IT
shows the basic characteristics of infrastructure technologies and, therefore, cannot be a source of competitive
advantage. The productivity paradox and the heated debate
about the BVIT endangered the position of the information
systems research community. Consequently, scholars
established the BVIT research stream to focus on the
‘‘how’s’’ and ‘‘why’s’’ of IT value creation within a firm or
a network of firms (Kohli and Grover 2008). The scientific
objective is basically ‘‘to fully capture and properly attribute the value generated by IT investments’’ (Kohli and
Grover 2008, p. 27). Indeed, the scientific efforts of the
research stream have been successful. Today, the existence
of the BVIT is increasingly becoming accepted (Kohli and

P. Afflerbach.: The Business Value of IT in Light of Prospect Theory, Bus Inf Syst Eng 57(5):299–310 (2015)

Grover 2008; Hu and Quan 2005; Kudyba and Diwan
2002; Thatcher and Oliver 2001; Lee and Menon 2000).
Nevertheless, the value proposition of IT is challenged
again and again, as evident in articles such as ‘‘The CIO
Dilemma,’’ published by the trading magazine InformationWeek, in which the diminishing role of CIOs is
described and the failure of IT to deliver innovations is
condemned (Martin 2007). Scientific discourses and
recurring debates have kept the research discipline up-todate and fascinating for the last 30 years, and its research
questions are still considered understudied (Kohli and
Grover 2008).
Before differentiating the objective from the perceived
value of IT, we start with defining the abstract terms IT and
BVIT. Within BVIT research, IT is often mentioned
together with information (and communication) systems
(IS), and often these terms are not clearly distinguished.
Therefore, this paper employs a comprehensive understanding of IT, utilizing the abbreviation to reference various technology classes, such as enterprise architectures,
databases, software applications, servers, networks, and
other infrastructure components. Combining the economic
concept of value and the comprehensive understanding of
IT leads to the concept of the BVIT, which is defined as
‘‘the organizational performance impacts of IT at both the
intermediate process level and the organization-wide level,
and comprising both efficiency impacts and competitive
impacts’’ (Melville et al. 2004, p. 287). A special attribute
of these effects is that they can be realized in multiple
strategic dimensions. Similar to Weill and Vitale (1999),
Oh and Pinsonneault (2007) describe a framework where
the value of IT is classified into three strategic effect types.
IT investments can aim at minimizing ‘‘operational costs
while maintaining a satisfactory level of quality,’’ ‘‘providing a unique combination of product attributes at a
reasonable cost,’’ or increasing the sales volume of organizations (Oh and Pinsonneault 2007, p. 245). In other
words, IT investments are intended to increase the revenues
or reduce the costs of an organization. Investments that
increase the sales volume and provide a higher degree of
product differentiation affect the firm’s revenues, defined
as the product of the sales volume and sales price.
Increased sales volume contributes directly to revenues,
and increased product differentiation can typically be
transferred into higher sales prices (Nault and Dexter
1995). We refer to IT investments that are characterized by
revenue effects as revenue investments. IT investments that
are aimed at reducing operational costs are defined as cost
investments. The above reasoning demonstrates that IT
investments typically underlie an ambiguity concerning
their strategic and monetary effects so far.
The perceived BVIT is the decision maker’s mental
interpretation of IT performance effects, and represents the
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expectations for the technology ex-ante to the investment.
Thus, it serves as a kind of filter for IT investment
opportunities. Only those IT projects that are perceived as
highly valuable will be put into practice. Consider a decision about the implementation of a new ERP system, where
different software suppliers offer their product and a firm
has to choose its favorite. The firm will choose the software
with the highest perceived business value. Only the chosen
ERP system can create real performance effects for the
firm, and the other decision alternatives never create any
BVIT. In other words, the perceived value constitutes the
first obstacle for IT to create any business value and
determines which IT projects are implemented and which
are rejected. The implemented projects in turn influence the
realized performance effects (i.e., the BVIT). Therefore,
the perceived and the objective BVIT both refer to the
same underlying construct, which is the performance
effects of IT, in the given example to the performance of an
ERP system. However, the irrationalities inherent in the
perception process can make the implemented IT or the
chosen ERP system deviate from the rational optimum. As
a result, the BVIT may fall short of its potential. The
identification and avoidance of irrationalities can, therefore, improve the BVIT.
The example of the ERP system illustrates the close
connection between perception and reality with regard to
the BVIT. However, there are important structural differences between these concepts. First, the BVIT refers to the
realized economic outcome of IT investments, which
includes cost reduction and revenue improvement. The
perceived BVIT is about how decision makers perceive the
benefits they can gain from IT investments, not about the
actually realized benefits. In other words, the BVIT is a real
and objective metric, whereas the perceived BVIT is a
mental and subjective construct. Second, both approaches
become relevant at different time points relative to the
investment decision. The BVIT becomes relevant in the
value chain of the organization ex-post to the decision and
focuses on past developments. The perceived value is
pertinent to the decision process (i.e., ex-ante to the decision), and is orientated toward the future. Third, due to its
ex-post character, the BVIT is measurable and, thereby,
certain. In contrast, the perceived BVIT is about future
performance effects that underlie uncertainties and risks.
Fourth, unlike the objective BVIT, the perceived BVIT is
prone to biases and heuristics. These factors ultimately lead
to deviations between the BVIT and the perceived BVIT.
Analyzing the performance effects of IT from a perceptional perspective is promising for the corresponding
research stream. Performance effects are not understood as
a realistic outcome but as the outcome of an economic
decision within an organization. Ultimately, it is organization-specific factors, not advance perceptions that
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determine how IT affects the performance of an organization. However, the particular manifestations and characteristics of the performance effects are also a
consequence of an organizational decision. Therefore, it is
relevant to consider not only the characteristics of IT in its
role within the value chain of an organization but also its
attributes within the decision process. Although the perceptional approach cannot be seen as substitutive or
superior, it may contribute to a more holistic understanding
of the BVIT. This research expands the spectrum of distinguishing features of IT investments.
2.2 Prospect Theory and the Quantification
of Perceived Value
In order to quantify the perceived value of IT, we apply PT,
which is probably the most prominent descriptive model
for human value perception. In the existing IS literature, PT
has been applied to explain phenomena such as the escalation of software projects (see, e.g., Keil et al. 2000), the
bidding behavior of consumers in online auctions (Wu
et al. 2009), and the deviations of expectations regarding
technological innovations between developers and users
(McAfee 2009). However, no analytical model exists that
introduces PT and the related behavioral aspects to BVIT
research (Fleischmann et al. 2014). The analytical
approach is crucial for the derivation of reliable results
from PT (Bromiley 2009). In general, PT analyzes human
decision-making with respect to observable violations of
expected utility theory (EUT) as a benchmark for a rational
value understanding. It represents an alternative approach
that complies with the observed violations. Whereas PT
descriptively analyzes how human beings make decisions
under risk, EUT normatively investigates how decisions
under risk should be made optimally and rationally. With
decisions under risk, the possible outcomes and the corresponding probabilities of occurrences for those outcomes
are known. In other words, a formal representation of the
decision problem is possible. In contrast, decisions under
uncertainty are characterized by unknown probabilities of
occurrence (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
PT identifies four characteristics of human value perception that are not addressed in EUT. First, decision
makers evaluate alternatives with respect to ‘‘gains’’ and
‘‘losses’’ relative to a given reference point. In this context,
the terms gain and loss do not refer to their economic
interpretation as positive or negative profits; rather, they
are defined as positive or negative deviations from the
reference point. Second, decision makers are characterized
by loss aversion, which means that their dislike for losses is
by a factor of about 2.25 higher than their fondness for
gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Third, decision
makers have asymmetric risk attitudes, which means that
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they are risk-seeking toward losses and risk-averse toward
gains. Fourth, the value perception is not exclusively
determined by the perception of the outcomes; it is also
influenced by the perception of the corresponding probabilities of occurrences for these outcomes. Human beings
nonlinearly transform the probability scale by overweighting small probabilities and underweighting moderate
and high probabilities in their perceptions (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) integrate
the first three effects concerning the perception of a single

outcome Oi in the so-called value function V ðOi Þ; where O
represents the reference point, a the risk attitude, and b the
loss aversion.

 a

ðOi  OÞ
for Oi  O
V ðOi Þ ¼
ð1Þ
a


bðO  Oi Þ for Oi \O
The value function per se does not reflect the described
risk attitudes and loss aversion, but a specific parametrization
of the function is required. To implement loss aversion, b has
to be strictly greater than one, and to implement the described
risk attitude a has to lie within the range between one and
zero. Figure 1 schematically illustrates the value function for
such a parameterization. The difference in the valuation of
losses and gains becomes obvious at the origin of the function, which is the reference point. Negative (losses) and
positive (gains) deviations from that reference point are
evaluated using different mathematical functions. The
function for the loss part is steeper than that for the gain part.
The different slopes reflect the concept of loss aversion.
Additionally, the curvatures of the functions are different.
The convexity of the left-hand side indicates the risk-seeking
loss valuation, whereas the concavity of right-hand side
implies the risk-averse gain valuation.
Viewed in isolation, the value function already reveals
key observations about human value perception. However,
it is insufficient in completely describing this complex
process. Decision behaviors, such as insurance contracts as
an example of risk-averse loss perception and gambling as
an example of risk-seeking gain valuation, contradict the
Perceived Value

Losses

Fig. 1 Value function from PT

Gains

Outcome
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value functions. To overcome this shortcoming and to
provide a closed model for human value perception, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) theory, along with other
descriptive theories for human decision-making, expands
the idea of value perception from a narrow outcome-oriented perception to a combined perception of outcomes and
probabilities. Through their concept of diminishing sensitivity, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) established the psychological foundation for the integration of probability
perception. This concept states that human beings become
less sensitive to changes in probabilities as they move away
from their natural reference points of certainty (probability
equal to 100 %) and impossibility (probability equal to
0 %). In other words, small probabilities are overvalued,
while high and moderate probabilities are undervalued. The
so-called weighting function from PT transfers objective
probabilities pi to perceived probabilities wðpi Þ by rescaling the objective probabilities consistent with the concept
of diminishing sensitivity (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
The rescaling is achieved analytically via an inverse Sshaped weighting function that is first concave and then
convex. Several empirical studies have validated this
functional form (see, e.g., Gonzalez and Wu 1999).
wðpi Þ ¼

pci
1

ðpci þ ð1  pÞc Þc

ð2Þ

Finally, PT combines the value function and the
weighting function into a combined function for the perceived value PV; which is strongly aligned with EUT. This
is especially appealing because PT can then be interpreted
as ‘‘a special case of the widely accepted normative theory’’ (Gonzalez and Wu 1999, p. 158). The product of the
weighted probability wðpi Þ and the outcome vðOi Þ equals
the perceived value for that outcome. The sum of the
perceived values for all possible outcomes represent the
perceived value of the decision alternative. Thus, the per 
~ resembles the funcceived value of an alternative PV O
tional form of an expected value:
n
  X
~ ¼
PV O
wðpi ÞvðOi Þ
ð3Þ
i¼1

The adjustment of the value function by the weighting
function has important implications for the results on
human value perception. The participation of people in
lotteries is not compatible with a risk-averse gain valuation, as indicated in the value function. Following the
definition of risk aversion, a risk-averse individual would
never pay a participation fee that exceeds the expected
value of the lottery winnings. However, if the small
probability of winning a lottery is overvalued, the perceived value of playing the lottery can also exceed its
expected value. Therefore, the overvaluation of small
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probabilities can override the undervaluation of the risky
decision from the pure outcome perception and transform
the risk-averse gain perception into a risk-seeking one. An
equivalent example on the loss side is the conclusion of
insurance contracts against large losses that occur with
small probability. In this case, the risk-seeking loss perception that contradicts such a behavior is changed into a
risk-averse perception by the overweighting of small
probabilities. Combining both functions introduces the
fourfold risk pattern (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Losses underlie a risk-seeking perception for large and moderate probabilities and a risk-averse perception for small
probabilities. Equivalently, the perception of gains is riskaverse for large and moderate probabilities and risk-seeking for small probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).

3 The Perceived Business Value of IT
In order to transfer the notion of individual value perception to the perceived value of IT within an organization, it
is important to address three main issues. First, the perceived value of an outcome is not identical to the perceived
value of an investment, as the value of an investment
requires the consideration of the status quo and the time
value of money. Second, the concept of perceived value
has to be matched to the strategic dimensions of the
objective BVIT to achieve a closed model that considers
the unique aspects of IT investments. Third, the applicability of PT is generally restricted to individual decisionmaking rather than firm-level (group) decision-making.
When managers make IT investment decisions, they may
go through several rounds of meetings, discussions, and
assessment. It is unclear whether PT is applicable to this
kind of relatively rational group decision-making process.
Although PT focuses on one-period outcomes rather
than on investment, the functional form of the perceived
value is not restricted to one-period outcomes. In order to
transfer the perceived value function from Eq. (3) to the
~ we introduce different paycontext of IT investments I,
ment dates and the time value of money. Therefore, we
replace an outcome Oi with an outcome for the net present
value of the IT investment Ii . The net present value is
defined as the difference between the discounted sum of the
positive payments associated with the investment and the
initial investment outflows. Ultimately, to derive the per~ we additionally
ceived value of an IT investment PVðIÞ,
need to consider the perceived value of the affected payments in the status quo PV ðSQÞ.
n
 X
PV I~ ¼
wðpi ÞvðIi Þ  PV ðSQÞ
ð4Þ
i¼1
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To account for the two different value forms originating
from IT investments, we match the dichotomy from the
strategic dimensions of the objective value and the perceived value functions from PT. Therefore, we must
determine whether IT investments are ‘‘framed’’ as a
potential reduction of organizational losses or as a potential
increase of organizational gains in the respective strategic
dimensions. The concept of framing also originates from
PT and states that variations in the formulation of a choice
problem (i.e., in terms of gains or losses) provoke different
value perceptions (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). If a
problem is formulated in the gain context, it is accordingly
evaluated from a risk-averse point of view for large and
moderate probabilities and from a risk-seeking point of
view for small probabilities. The risk attitudes, however,
are reversed if the same problem is formulated in a loss
context. The BVIT can originate from revenue investments
and cost investments; typically, revenues are perceived
positively, and costs are perceived negatively. Consequently, the hypothesis arises that revenue investments are
framed in a gain context and cost investments in a loss
context. This hypothesis has been confirmed by Fogelström
et al. (2009) within the IT context of market-driven software product development. In a survey with 71 student
participants from a software engineering master’s program,
they empirically demonstrate that software requirements
associated with the revenue dimension underlie a riskaverse value perception, whereas software requirements
associated with the cost dimension trigger a risk-seeking
value perception. For our model, this means that the perception of revenues R can be described by the gain value
function and that the perception of costs C follows the loss
value function. In other words, the reference point for IT
investments is zero. Therefore, the perceived values for
cost and revenue investments can be described in the following form:
n
  X
PV R~ ¼
wðpi ÞðRi Þa ðSQR Þa
i¼1

for revenue investments
n
  X
wðpi ÞðbðCi Þa Þ þ bðSQC Þa
PV C~ ¼
i¼1

for cost investments
Finally, to transfer the concept of perceived value to the
BVIT, we must consider that IT decisions are typically not
individual; they are organizational. Indeed, the current
literature shows no consensus about the question of whether PT can be applied for organizational decision-making.
On the one hand, there is empirical evidence that PT can
explain the risk–return decisions of organizations (e.g.,
Bromiley 1991; Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988; Singh
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1986). On the other hand, organizations also show behaviors that do not comply with original PT, such as the
conservative behavior of organizations in the presence of
poor performance (e.g., Chattopadhyay et al. 2001;
Cameron et al. 1987). As is often the case, modern research
results unite these opposing findings. The value function
from PT can be applied to organizational valuation if the
context of the organization is considered (Shimizu 2007)
and if it is parameterized differently (Wen 2010). Whereas
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) operationalize their value
function with a ¼ 0:88 and b ¼ 2:25, Wen (2010) derives
a parameterization with a ¼ 0:45 and b ¼ 1:69 for organizations. Thus, organizations underlie the same perception
effects of asymmetric risk attitudes and loss aversion but
on a more moderate level as compared to individuals. The
applicability of the weighting function has, to the best of
our knowledge, not yet been tested in an organizational
context. However, the results from Wen (2010), which
indicate an ambiguous rather than fourfold gain–loss perception, suggest that organizations do not follow the
fourfold risk pattern and that they scale probabilities nearly
correctly. Wen (2010) finds clear evidence for a risk-averse
gain perception and a risk-seeking loss valuation. If organizations were subject to a fourfold risk pattern, it is likely
that the clear results for the risk attitudes could not have
been derived. Because there are indications that organizations scale probabilities correctly and there are no contradictory research results, we assume that organizations do
not follow the fourfold risk pattern and that the weighting
function is not descriptive for organizations. Consequently,
the functions for perceived IT values are transformed to the
following equations:
n
  X
PV R~ ¼
pi ðRi Þa ðSQR Þa
i¼1

for revenue investments
n
  X
pi ðbðCi Þa Þ þ bðSQC Þa
PV C~ ¼

ð6Þ

i¼1

for cost investments
With the preceding argumentation, we introduced our
model of the perceived value of IT, an approach that is new
to this research stream and, thus, represents a new analytical lens for observing phenomena within this context. We
illustrated that the different dimensions of strategic IT
value can be assigned to different sections of the perceived
value function from PT. This perceived value function
incorporates four important features of human valuation
perception: asymmetric risk aversion, loss aversion, reference point valuation, and nonlinear probability transformation. Although developed for individual value
perception, the theory can be transferred to organizational
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value perception, with the exception of probability scaling,
by an adjustment of the parameterization. We conclude that
organizations evaluate IT revenue investments as organizational gains and, thereby, differently than they evaluate
IT cost investments. Whereas cost investments are perceived to reduce organizational losses and are accordingly
evaluated from a risk-seeking perspective, revenue
investments are considered to increase organizational gains
and are evaluated from a risk-averse perspective. Moreover, cost investments are typically perceived to be more
valuable as a result of the loss aversion. In the following,
we apply our model to a concrete IT investment decision to
analyze the productivity and perception paradoxes of IT.
Therefore, we need to model the effects and the risks of an
investment option. As both the isolated success of the IT
project and the business environment can influence the
effects of the investment, we consider multiple possible
outcomes. The effects of an investment are then represented by the expected changes in the costs or revenues
relative to the status quo l. The risks of an investment are
modeled as the variance of the relative effects r2 .
In the Supplementary appendix (available online via
http://link.springer.com), we show that the perceived BVIT
from formula (6) can be approximated by the application of
a two-step Taylor series for any probability distribution.
This approximation describes the BVIT according to the
first two moments of the underlying probability distribution: the expected effects and their variance. Additionally,
the approximation makes revenue investments and cost
investments mutually comparable, as their expressions are
brought down to a similar functional form.


 
1
1
PV R~  aðSQR Þa lR þ ða  1Þl2R þ ða  1Þr2R
2
2
for revenue investments


 
1
1
PV C~  baðSQC Þa lC  ða  1Þl2C  ða  1Þr2C
2
2
for cost investments
ð7Þ
4 The Paradoxes of IT
4.1 The Perception Paradox of IT
BVIT research has shown that IT productivity is mainly
associated with improvements in customer satisfaction,
product and service quality, and convenience (i.e., effects
are associated with revenue investments) (Papp 1999).
Surprisingly, in practice this aspect of the BVIT is only
partly perceived, and the cost-reduction effects of IT are
more highly valued (Gartner 2013; Papp 1999; Henderson
and Venkatraman 1993). This misperception is due to a
variety of reasons. First, the revenue effects of IT are often
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intangible and, therefore, more difficult to quantify than the
effects on costs are, demotivating managers from making
revenue investments in IT (Papp 1999). Second, IT revenue
investments typically face a higher risk than operational
investments do because of the uncertainty of the competitive environment. IT can only create revenues via the
interplay with market and environmental factors. Given the
underlying dynamics of these factors, the risk of revenue
investments is typically higher. Third, the information
asymmetry between the users of IT and the senior managers of the organization supports such a biased cost focus.
A disparity exists between the successes perceived by the
two stakeholder groups ex-post to the investments.
Whereas users experience the positive aspects of technology investments (e.g., service quality), senior managers do
not realize these intangible effects; rather, they note only
the high IT expenditures. As a result, senior managers
become frustrated with IT, are not aware of the technology
as a strategic asset, and view cost reduction as the main
objective for IT decisions (Hirschheim and Lacity 2000).
All of these explanations take a perceptional perspective
on IT decisions. Because the revenue effects of IT decision
are intangible, decision makers perceive them as more
risky. The information asymmetry and the associated
frustration at the top-management level directly provoke
such a one-sided perception. As PT is an acknowledged
approach to quantify the value perceptions of human
beings and organizations (Wen 2010), it may provide
additional insights and explanations for this perceptional
issue. The behavioral element’s loss aversion and asymmetric risk attitudes may further confirm the existence of
this paradox. PT formulates that loss reduction is more
valuable than an equal amount of gain increase. If the risks
of gain increases and loss reductions are also considered,
the asymmetric risk attitudes reinforce the perceptional
dominance of loss reductions. In other words, the risk
diminishes the perceived value of gain increases, but
amplifies the perceived value of loss reductions. Because
cost investments are framed as loss reductions and revenue
investments as gain increases, cost investments inherit the
perceptional dominance of loss reductions.
Based on our model, we can prove this claim analytically. To that end, we compare the perceived values for two
identical IT investments that differ only in their type. In
doing so, we distinguish the perceptional effects described
by PT from the other explanations, such as the different
risk–return profiles. This controlled setting enables us to
show that the perception paradox still holds if the other
explanations are not given, and that the irrational value
perception is responsible for the perception paradox. Even
if this constructed decision between two identical investments is unrealistic, the proof under the artificial conditions
suggests that the true explanation for the paradox does not
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lie exclusively in one of the presented approaches but in a
combination of them. The application of PT, therefore,
complements and enhances the existing theory in this
regard.
The mathematical proof is depicted in the Supplementary appendix. The proof implies that the perception
paradox holds true for identical IT investments with positive expected effects. If the information provided about the
investments suggests positive performance effects, loss
aversion and asymmetric risk attitudes can explain a biased
choice between cost and revenue investments. This condition is probably fulfilled in reality. In general, high-level
executives make IT decisions based on proposals from the
IT department; moreover, the IT department is unlikely to
propose investment opportunities with negative business
cases to the senior executives (Tallon et al. 2001). Ultimately, the analysis reveals that the perception paradox has
a negative influence on the BVIT, as it implies that more
valuable revenue investments with higher expected effects
are eschewed in favor of objectively less valuable cost
investments.
4.2 The Productivity Paradox of IT
The possible explanations for the productivity paradox can
be classified into four categories. First, unique characteristics of IT capital investments, such as the high pace of
technological improvements, require organizations to
replace or upgrade their IT more frequently than they do
other capital investments. With every adjustment of the IT
landscape, an organization loses experience effects, and
productivity decreases (Yorukoglu 1998; David 1991).
Consequently, the overall productivity effects of IT
investments are smaller than those for traditional investments. Second, measurement errors in pioneer studies on
the value of IT may be responsible for the emergence of the
productivity paradox. These measurement errors stem from
the general weaknesses of productivity statistics, which
become especially relevant within the context of IT productivity (Denison 1989). Productivity statistics typically
underestimate quality and speed improvements, which are
exactly the main benefits of IT investments (Brynjolfsson
1993). Third, the value of IT could be of a redistributive
rather than a creative nature. In other words, IT may be
valuable to certain organizations but unproductive when
considering several competing organizations. This is
because the value of IT can be grounded in the exclusivity
of information, enabling an organization to attract market
shares from competitors (Brynjolfsson 1993). Fourth, and
probably most obviously, the productivity paradox exists
because of poor investment decisions or failures in the
management of IT projects. Indeed, empirical results
illustrate that the success of an IT project depends highly
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on correct management and valuation procedures (Petter
et al. 2013).
With the consideration of the measurement errors and
the application of more sophisticated methods, a significant
number of studies have shown the existence of the BVIT
(e.g., Tallon et al. 2001; Gurbaxani et al. 1998). However,
the valuation issue of IT is still valid today and is often
referred to as the ‘‘new productivity paradox.’’ The new
productivity paradox was coined by Anderson et al. (2003)
and postulates that although IT returns do exist, the estimates for these returns tend to be overestimated (Dewan
et al. 2007). One explanation for the new productivity
paradox is hidden IT capital. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995)
argue that IT investments are always carried out in a
decentralized fashion, which makes it hard to estimate and
track the complete extent of invested capital. Underestimating the invested capital leads automatically to an
overestimation of IT returns. Another explanation for the
new productivity paradox lies in complementary organizational investments that typically follow IT investments.
Unlike traditional capital investments, IT investments
require organizational changes to create the expected
return. These additional investments in the organizational
capital are often not considered in IT return estimates.
By analyzing the new productivity paradox within our
model, we can provide an alternative, or complementary,
explanation for the observation. Although the true explanation is likely to be a mixture of the presented notions,
every additional part of the puzzle enables the entire theory
to better explain reality. Having shown the preference for
IT cost investments, we also focus the analysis of the new
productivity paradox on this investment type. Readdressing
the derived perceived value of cost investments, it becomes
evident that the variance and, therefore, the risk of such
investments are perceived positively. This is because of the
risk-seeking valuation of organizational losses. The reasoning can be illustrated mathematically by showing that
the first derivative of the perceived value function with
respect to the variance is strictly positive (see Supplementary appendix).
As a consequence of the positive valuation of risk
ða\1Þ, the BVIT is overestimated relative to the expected
effects. In other words, the perceived value of IT is larger
than the expected value of IT. If a failure is defined as a
negative deviation from the target value, assigning a higher
value to these investments naturally leads to a higher
failure rate.
4.3 Resolutions for the Paradoxes
At the same time our model provides new insights into the
origins of the paradoxes, it also derives two possible resolutions for them. First, a shift in the corporate culture
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concerning the reputation of IT within an organization can
help to overcome the irrationalities in the decision process.
We demonstrate that loss aversion and asymmetric risk
attitudes are at least partly responsible for the perception and
productivity paradoxes. A possible solution for the paradoxes can be a change within the mindset of practical
decision makers. If IT is no longer understood as a cost
factor but as a source of competitive advantage and transformability, basic issues of the paradoxes can be resolved.
Within our model, this shift in perspectives results in an
adjustment of the reference point from a pure gain–loss
perspective (reference point equals zero) to a status quo
consideration. In terms of PT, the framing of the different
investment types is eliminated. Consequently, a reduction of
costs and an increase in revenues are both perceived as an
increase in profits. As a result, cost and revenue investments
are perceived equally, and at least one foundation of the
perception paradox can no longer exist. Moreover, the productivity paradox is also solved with such a switch in perspectives; the overvaluation of IT cost investments is
replaced by undervaluation. Similar to risk-dependent
overvaluation, undervaluation becomes more extreme for
riskier investments. A higher risk results in the realization of
more extreme effects, both in the positive and negative
directions. The loss aversion causes decision makers to
perceive the more positive effects as less valuable relative to
their negative perception of the more extreme downsides.
From an economic point of view, undervaluation is probably
less problematic than overvaluation, as the only investment
opportunities executed are those still profitable after a risk
discount. Consequently, rather than the false decision-making described in the productivity paradox, decision quality
increases due to more prudent value perception. This argumentation only holds if an organization has sufficient
investment opportunities. If this is not the case, the organization misses favorable investment opportunities and,
thereby, again reduces the value of their IT. However, in a
realistic setting, the IT budget is probably smaller than the
firm’s investment opportunities.
A second possible resolution for these incidents of
perception biases and, therefore, for the paradoxes is the
establishment of financial constraints and corporate governance mechanisms. Wen (2010) empirically demonstrates that the ambiguity and irrationalities in
organizational decision-making can be prevented if such
control strategies are executed, although the individual
decision makers still underlie these issues. The enhancement of corporate governance mechanisms, ‘‘high cash
flow rights of controlling groups, high percentage of board
seats held by non-controlling groups, high ownership of
board members and independent director’’ are adequate
actions to overcome the problems associated with irrational
decision-making (Wen 2010, p. 126).
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
BVIT research analyzes the performance effects of IT at
the firm level. This research stream originates from historic
doubts regarding the productivity impacts of IT investments. For the last 30 years, BVIT researchers have
focused on alleviating these doubts and on analyzing the
basic conditions and attributes of IT value. In addition to
empirical and analytical approaches, the conceptual
research stream applies economic theories to construct the
scientific underpinning for the value proposition of IT. We
take up this approach and develop the concept of the perceived BVIT. The perceived BVIT is defined as the decision maker’s mental interpretation of potential IT
performance effects. Both concepts are different constructions of the same object and are, thus, related to each
other. The perceived BVIT determines the IT investment
opportunities chosen in the decision process and, ultimately, the structure of the IT landscape. In this way, it
serves as a kind of filter for IT investments. Only IT
investments with a high perceived BVIT are executed and
create BVIT for organizations; opportunities with a BVIT
perceived as low are not implemented and, thus, not
associated with the BVIT. The key problem of IT value
perception is that it is prone to the biases of loss aversion,
of reference point-dependent valuation, and of asymmetric
risk attitudes. To quantify and investigate the effects of
these biases on IT decision-making, we set up a model for
BVIT perception by applying PT. Based on our model, we
ultimately show that the classical biases, inherent in human
value perception, lead to irrational perception schemata,
such as the preference of cost investments over revenue
investments (perception paradox) and the structural overvaluation of IT benefits (productivity paradox). The perception paradox biases the investment decision toward cost
investments; objectively more valuable revenue investments may be neglected in favor of objectively less valuable cost investments. The misperceptions associated with
the productivity paradox lead to a high proportion of IT
investments that cannot meet expectations and, thus, to a
riskier investment strategy. Overall, we can state that the
biased perception makes the selection of IT investment
irrational. Therefore, in reality, the realized BVIT is lower
than it could be. Figure 2 illustrates our framework and our
research results.
A better understanding of the irrationalities influencing
IT decisions can provide the basis for the derivation of
potential solutions and retaliatory actions. A possible
approach is an adjustment of the corporate culture. If IT is
perceived as a value driver, and not as a cost factor, of
organizations, the value paradoxes are corrected automatically. The basic mechanisms of PT still hold, but the
elimination of the framing effects resolve the ambiguous
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Fig. 2 The perceived value of
IT
Loss
aversion
Reference point
dependent valuation
Asymmetric risk
attitudes

value perception. A second approach for the avoidance of
an irrational selection of IT projects is the establishment of
adequate corporate governance mechanisms and financial
constraints. This is because both strategies avoid loss
aversion and asymmetric risk attitudes in organizational
decision-making and, therefore, resolve the ambiguous
perception at its origin.
The scientific contribution of this paper is twofold. First,
we apply one of the most honored economic theories to the
context of BVIT research and quantify the perceived BVIT.
In doing so, we expand the toolkit for future analyses and
studies in this discipline. Second, we theoretically prove
that irrationalities in human valuation behavior are (at least
partly) responsible for the existence of two fundamental
paradoxes of IT. For this reason, we want to encourage a
rethinking within the practical perception of IT. We analytically show that the value of IT would be higher and
perceived more accurately if decision makers avoid
unfairly viewing IT departments as cost factor. This result
is somewhat philosophical and can be criticized as suffering from a certain tautology. Indeed, the notion that IT
creates value if this value is also perceived, can be
described as a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, the loss
aversion and asymmetric risk assessment observed in
human behavior explicitly require this kind of rethinking.
Although PT has already been applied in IS research for
the explanation of certain phenomena, such as the escalation of IT projects and the bidding behavior in software
projects, it has not yet been established as a general theoretical approach for BVIT research (Fleischmann et al.
2014). The reason for this may be that the conceptual and
quantitative research streams typically focus on the performance effects of the existing IT landscape in their
organizational environment and, frequently, do not consider the existing IT as stemming from prior decision
problems. Thereby, the ex post BVIT is their main research
object. In contrast, the analytical research stream focuses
foremost on the ex ante BVIT and develops decision
models that determine the optimal selection of IT projects.
We adopt this point of view of an ex ante decision problem,
but we descriptively analyze how the decision problem
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Perception Paradox:
Preference of cost
investments

Perceived
BVIT

Implemented
IT
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BVIT

Productivity Paradox:
Overvaluation of IT
investments

might be approached in practice. In doing so, we adopt the
predominant perspective of the analytical research stream
to focus on the main research objective of the empirical
and conceptual approaches. As a result, this study investigates not only the characteristics of IT in its role in the
value creation of an organization but also its attributes
within the decision process. Features such as the risk–return profile, the type of IT investment, and the corporate
governance and culture should be integrated in further
analyses of the BVIT.
Thus, our approach complements the existing conceptual underpinning for BVIT research, as it introduces a new
perspective on the issue. The same holds true for the
explanation of both of the paradoxes. The application of PT
reinforces the extant research results from another perspective and provides additional insights regarding the
resolution of the paradoxes. Therefore, the theoretical
contribution of our paper to BVIT research and the two
paradoxes does not lie in a radical reorganization of the
conceptual background, but in the expansion of it. With
every complementary contribution, it is critical to question
whether the presumably higher explanatory power of the
theory justifies the higher degree of complexity. As is often
the case in economic research, the answer to this question
is: it depends. More specifically, it depends on the validity
of the research results. If the additional consideration of PT
enhances the explanatory power of the entire theoretical
framework of BVIT research, the higher complexity is
justified. As PT focuses on different aspects than the
existing theoretical concepts do, the explanatory power of
the entire framework is likely to increase. However, the
final answer to the validity question can only be found
through quantitative and empirical analyses. Based on our
findings, we can derive two central hypotheses for such an
empirical validation. First, the higher the firm’s degree of
loss aversion and asymmetry of risk attitudes is, the larger
is the portion of its IT investment portfolio focused on the
reduction of operational costs. We have theoretically
shown that more pronounced biases lead to a less balanced
perception of cost and revenue investments and, consequently, to a less balanced IT landscape. Second, the higher
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the firm’s degree of loss aversion and asymmetry of risk
attitudes is, the higher is the perceived failure rate of the
firm’s IT investments. Our model suggests that more pronounced biases lead to a higher overestimation of IT benefits, which, in turn, more easily provokes frustration with
the investments. The appropriate methodology for the
validation of these hypotheses is probably an empirical
field study. The loss aversion and the asymmetry of risk
attitudes of the firm’s decision makers can be applied as
independent variables. Additionally, variables that describe
the corporate governance of the firm can be used, as Wen
(2010) reveals a positive relationship between the pronunciations of the biases and the corporate governance. As
for the dependent variables, the ratio between cost and
revenue investments is promising for the first hypothesis,
and the perceived failure rate of the decision makers is
applicable for the second one. Significantly positive and
substantial relationships between the independent and
dependent variables would support our findings. The
required data has to be gathered from questioning the
firm’s decision makers and from archival sources. Overall,
we believe that the perceptional perspective on the BVIT is
a promising field for future research and that our model
constitutes a solid foundation for that purpose.
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